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1.  Introduction 
August Schleicher (1821–1868) is a curious figure in the history of linguistics. From his 
own time to the present day he has enjoyed universal recognition for his technical innovations, 
which consolidated the field of Indo-European historical-comparative grammar. The reactions 
to his philosophical pronouncements on the nature of language, on the other hand, have 
generally ranged from simple rejection to outright ridicule. The peak of Schleicher’s 
metaphysical excesses would have to be his claim that human languages are “natural 
organisms” that “came into being, grew and developed according to fixed laws and which in 
turn will age and die off” (Schleicher 1863: 7 [all translations are my own: JMc]).1 
As is reflected in the title of the essay from which the words above are quoted – Die 
Darwinsche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft – the occasion for this most explicit 
formulation of Schleicher’s metaphysical position was his first contact with the evolutionary 
theory of Charles Darwin (1809–1882). Subsequent scholarship on Schleicher has tended to 
focus on this Darwinian connection, even though it has long been established that 
Schleicher’s views have other origins that pre-date his contact with Darwin’s work and were 
in many respects quite different, even incompatible, with Darwinism (see Koerner 1989: 337-
355). Indeed, in the lively exchange between linguistic and biological theory in the 19th 
century, the balance of trade is generally in favour of the former (see Alter 1999). 
The almost exclusive attention to the Darwinian perspective has obscured other features of 
Schleicher’s historical context. For his critics in the world of mid- to late 19th-century 
linguistics in Germany, Schleicher was in the first instance not an adherent of Darwinism, but 
of ‘materialism’.2 This is a charge levelled at Schleicher by his constant opponent H. Steinthal 
(1823–1899; e.g., Steinthal 1881: 47) and his otherwise sympathetic biographer Salomon 
Lefmann (1831–1912; e.g., Lefmann 1870: 73). In the following generation, the accusation 
was renewed by Georg von der Gabelentz (1840–1893) and Hugo Schuchardt (1843–1927; 
e.g., Schuchardt 1928 [1922]: 91-97), where it was extended to Schleicher’s heirs, the 
Neogrammarians. Gabelentz commented: 
It was a strange one-sidedness that wanted to align linguistics with the natural sciences. 
Admittedly, we cannot convince an unsophisticated materialism like that which just a few 
                                               
* I would like to thank Nick Riemer, Bart Karstens, Jan Noordegraaf and the two anonymous referees for 
Historiographia Linguistica for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper. 
1 Original: “Die Sprachen sind Naturorganismen, die [...] entstunden, nach bestimmten Gesetzen wuchsen und 
sich entwickelten und wiederum altern und absterben [...]” 
2 Desmet (1996) takes a much broader perspective on ‘la linguistique naturaliste’ in France, which in many ways 
took its cue from Schleicher. He examines at length the role played in France by French versions of scientific 
materialism. 
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decades ago confused immature minds that not all science is natural science; and as Charles 
Darwin finally stepped forward with his epoch-making theory, even a serious linguist like 
August Schleicher extended to him the hand of brotherhood. (Gabelentz 2016 [1891]: 15)3  
In this paper, we explore the accusation of materialism made against Schleicher, what it 
meant, the ends it served, and whether it was in fact justified. We begin in section 2 with an 
examination of the aspects of Schleicher’s theorizing that provoked the accusation. We then 
look in section 3 at the main criticisms embodied in the charge, with particular attention to the 
detailed critiques of Steinthal. In section 4, we identify Schleicher’s place in relation to the 
politically engaged movement of scientific materialism. Section 5 turns to Schleicher’s 
biography to show how his own political views, social background and personal experiences 
bound him to the movement. Finally, section 6 offers a conclusion. 
 
2.  Morphology and Schleicher’s philosophy of science 
Our point of departure in this paper, that most striking claim of Schleicher’s that 
languages are natural organisms, is the conclusion he reaches at the end of a discussion of 
linguistic methodology. Schleicher  praises linguists’ increasing emulation of natural 
scientists’ methods, an approach validated by the underlying commonality in kind between 
their respective objects of study. “From the natural scientists”, Schleicher (1863: 6) insists, 
“we can learn to appreciate that only the fact established by secure, strictly objective 
observation and the correct conclusion built on this has any validity for science […]”.4 All 
scientists, linguists included, must limit themselves to “the precise observation of organisms 
and their laws of life”, since “all talk, however ingenious, which slips away from this solid 
ground is devoid of any scientific value” (ibid., pp. 6-7).5 
There are two pillars to Schleicher’s scientific method as it is presented here, the 
empirical examination of the given ‘organisms’ of languages and the positing of ‘laws of life’ 
that govern their development. These are in turn the two points of contention targeted by the 
accusations of materialism. As we see in the following section, it was not so much distaste at 
Schleicher’s biological phraseology that motivated these critiques as a thoroughgoing 
disagreement with the specific approach Schleicher took. In any case, these two principles 
have a long history in Schleicher’s thought and had earlier found expression in different, non-
biological terms. As Koerner (1989: 343-355) shows, hints of these principles are apparent 
even in Schleicher’s very first book, the 1848 Zur vergleichenden Sprachgeschichte, where 
they are couched in terms of idealist philosophy, while the explicit advocacy of a linguistics 
modelled on the natural sciences appears as early as in his second book, the 1850 Die 
Sprachen Europas in systematischer Übersicht.  
                                               
3 Original: “Eine seltsame Einseitigkeit war es, die Sprachwissenschaft den Naturwissenschaften einreihen zu 
wollen. Einem platten Materialismus, wie er noch vor wenigen Jahrzehnten unreife Köpfe verwirrte, ist freilich 
nicht einzureden, dass nicht alle Wissenschaft Naturwissenschaft sei; und als nun vollends Charles Darwin mit 
seiner epochemachenden Theorie hervortrat, da streckte ihm selbst ein ernsthafter Linguist wie August 
Schleicher die Bruderhand entgegen.” 
4 Original: “Bei den Naturforschern kann man einsehen lernen, dass für die Wissenschaft nur die durch sichere, 
streng objective Beobachtung festgestellte Tatsache und der auf diese gebaute richtige Schluss Geltung hat […]” 
5 Original: “Nur die genaue Beobachtung der Organismen und ihrer Lebensgesetze, nur die völlige Hingabe an 
das wissenschaftliche Object soll die Grundlage auch unserer Disciplin bilden; alles noch so geistreiche Gerede, 
das jenes festen Grundes enträth, ist jedes wissenschaftlichen Werthes bar und ledig.” 
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In Die Sprachen Europas, Schleicher (1850: 1-5) introduces a distinction between 
‘philology’ (Philologie), which treats language as a means to understanding the mental and 
cultural life of its speakers, and ‘linguistics’ (Linguistik), which has “language as such” (die 
Sprache als solche) as its object of study.6 Language as such is part of the “natural history of 
man” (Naturgeschichte des Menschen) and because of this the method of linguistics is 
“completely different from that of all historical sciences and essentially aligns itself with the 
method of the other natural sciences” (ibid., p.2).7 Like the other natural sciences, linguistics 
is based on ‘observation’ (Beobachtung) and deals with an area ruled by “unchangeable 
natural laws” (unabänderliche natürliche Gesetze). 
The aspect of language most clearly subject to natural laws, according to Schleicher (1850: 
3-5), is the Formenlehre, for which he adopts the term ‘Morphologie’ in his 1859 essay “Zur 
Morphologie der Sprache”. In this essay, he sets out a system of formulae for describing the 
full range of morphological structures exhibited in the world’s languages and in the process 
clearly circumscribes the limits of empirical scientific observation in linguistics. Morphology 
deals only with the “outer phonetic form of language” (äußere lautliche Form der Sprache). 
He envisaged a complementary discipline that would deal with the functions of these forms, 
but did not “dare for the moment to step into this area of research which penetrates into the 
innermost being of language, since [he] as yet lack[ed] guiding concepts and methods” 
(Schleicher 1859: 1).8 In the following years, however, Schleicher’s methodological wariness 
solidified into ontology. In his 1865 essay “Über die Bedeutung der Sprache für die 
Naturgeschichte des Menschen”, the sequel to his 1863 Darwinian essay, Schleicher (1865a: 8) 
collapses language onto a single material plane: “Language is the symptom perceptible 
through the ear of the activity of a complex of material relations in the formation of the brain 
and the language organs with their nerves, bones, muscles etc.”9 In the same year, he draws 
the consequences of this position for linguistics in his study of the Unterscheidung von 
Nomen und Verbum in der lautlichen Form: 
The linguistic sound, the phonetic form of language, is the body, the phenomenon of the 
function, of the content of language. Neither appears separate from the other, they are always 
inseparably bound to one another. They are identical, even if of course not of the same kind. 
We have no right to assume functions where they are not indicated by sounds. Even in 
language the mind, the function, does not run independently of its body, the sound, but is 
always only really present in and through the latter. Our view of language is not dualistic, but 
rather monistic and we can consider only this [view] justified. (Schleicher 1865b: 502)10 
                                               
6 Schleicher later preferred the term Glottik to Linguistik as the name for this branch of language study (see 
Koerner 1989: 350, n.45). Glottik is used consistently from Schleicher (1859) onwards. 
7 Original: “Demzufolge ist auch die Methode der Linguistik von der aller Geschichtswissenschaften total 
verschieden und schliesst sich wesentlich der Methode der übrigen Naturwissenschaften an.” 
8 Original: “In den kreiß diser ins innerste wesen der sprache vor dringenden forschung zu treten, wage ich zur 
zeit noch nicht, da es mir hier an leitenden grundanschauungen und an methoden noch gebricht.” 
9 Original: “Die Sprache ist das durch das Ohr wahrnehmbare Symptom der Tätigkeit eines Complexes 
materieller Verhältnisse in der Bildung des Gehirns und der Sprachorgane mit ihren Nerven, Knochen, Muskeln 
u. s. f.” 
10 Original: “Der sprachlaut, die lautliche form der sprache, ist der körper, die erscheinung der function, des 
inhaltes der sprache. Beide kommen nicht von einander getrennt vor, sie sind stäts untrenbar verbunden. Sie sind 
identisch, wenn auch natürlich nicht einerlei. Wir haben kein recht, functionen da vorauß zu setzen, wo keine 
lautform ir vorhandensein an zeigt. Auch in der sprache läuft nicht der geist, die function, unabhängig von 
seinem leibe, dem laute, sondern er ist nur in und durch letzteren wirklich vorhanden. Unsere anschauung vom 
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Schleicher (1865b: 505-506) concludes: “We therefore maintain the conviction that nothing 
occurs in the speaker that is not expressed phonetically; that the sound is a fully valid and 
indeed the only witness of the function and that therefore a language only has those functions 
that it indicates phonetically.”11 That is, there is no inner life of language that is not 
immediately perceptible in its outer phonetic shell. 
 
3.  Contemporary objections to Schleicher’s philosophy of science 
At each step Schleicher took down the materialist path, he was met with opposition from 
Steinthal. The most direct and succinct formulations of this opposition appear in Steinthal’s 
reviews of Schleicher’s successive writings. Unfortunately, no dialogue ensued between the 
two: Schleicher is reputed to have said of Steinthal, “I don’t read anything of his anymore” 
(Von dem lese ich nichts mehr [Lefmann 1870: 101]). But at least Steinthal’s reviews leave us 
with one explicitly articulated side of the debate. Beginning with his review of Schleicher’s 
(1859) ‘Morphologie’ essay, Steinthal attacks the two pillars of Schleicher’s natural scientific 
approach to language study: 
Herr Schleicher excludes from the very beginning […] the historical movement of language, 
its development, from his consideration; and moreover he takes the study of the function of 
individual parts of the word and the word itself as a “complement of morphology” and does 
not “dare” to enter into this area of research […] (Steinthal 1860: 434)12  
Schleicher’s exclusion of the “historical movement of language” rests on the second pillar of 
his scientific method as outlined in the previous section, adherence to unchangeable natural 
laws of development. His degradation of functions to a “complement of morphology” is of 
course a corollary of the first pillar, his singular concentration on perceptible outer form. 
As with his treatment of functions, Schleicher did not so much exclude the historical 
development of forms in his ‘Morphologie’ essay as put it to one side. His morphological 
formulae were intended in the first instance to provide – in present-day parlance – a 
synchronic description of forms in languages without consideration of their history (see 
Schleicher 1859: 1). But it was only against the background assumption that languages 
develop according to an overarching deterministic plan that individual forms could be 
characterized as belonging to specific types. This is clear in Schleicher’s popularizing 1860 
Deutsche Sprache, which followed immediately after the ‘Morphologie’ essay, where 
Schleicher employs his formulae in a survey of morphological types in the world’s languages 
and sketches the universal laws of growth and decline that govern the evolution from type to 
type (Schleicher 1860: 3-71). In opposition to Schleicher’s view of development, Steinthal 
asserts a kind of historical particularism, in which every individual form has a unique identity 
that is the product of a complex developmental history involving the interaction of numerous 
                                                                                                                                                  
wesen der sprache ist keine dualistische, sondern eine monistische und nur dise können wir für berechtigt 
halten.” 
11 Original: “Wir halten demnach an der überzeugung fest, daß nichts im sprechenden vor geht, was nicht 
lautlich auß gedrükt wird; daß der laut ein volgiltiger und zwar der einzige zeuge für die function ist und daß 
also eine sprache nur die functionen besizt, welche sie lautlich bezeichnet.” 
12  Original: “Herr Schleicher schliesst von vornherein […] den geschichtlichen Gang der Sprache, ihre 
Entwicklung, von seiner Betrachtung aus; und ferner gilt ihm die Lehre von der Function der einzelnen Theile 
des Wortes und des Wortes selbst für eine ‚Ergänzung der Morphologie’, und er ‚wagt’ es nicht, in den Kreis 
dieser Forschung einzutreten […]” 
 5 
internal and external factors. On Steinthal’s view, it is impossible to consider a single form in 
any language as an instance of some pre-existing universally given type. 
Steinthal (1860: 434) buttresses his historical particularism with a quotation from the 
Allgemeine Physiologie (1851) of Hermann Lotze (1817–1881), which in turn appeals to 
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) to support the principle that “the form is at each 
moment the more immediate or distant result of functions – that is, not simply constant forces, 
but also processes and situations into which the parts that are taking shape are brought” 
(Lotze 1851: 324).13 This is a key doctrine of Lotze’s ‘functional morphology’, in which he 
argued against the immanent determinism of contemporary theories of morphology in biology 
by pointing out the role played by external factors in shaping the ontogenetic development of 
living organisms (see Pester 1997: 169-184; cf. Beiser 2014: 62-70). We see in his invocation 
of Lotze’s Allgemeine Physiologie that Steinthal’s objections were not so much targeted 
against the importation of concepts and methods from the natural sciences as against the 
specific brand of ‘morphology’ that Schleicher sought to adopt. Citing Lotze’s example here 
as well, Steinthal (1860: 433) makes the case that even “morphology in natural science is still 
today little more than a desideratum” (die Morphologie in der Naturwissenschaft [… ist] bis 
heute noch wenig mehr als ein Desideratum). 
It should be noted that Steinthal’s arguments were also not directed at the formalizing 
enterprise in general. Indeed, Steinthal was apt to indulge in formalization himself: his 
‘psychological formulae’ (psychologische Formeln) were an attempt to formalize the 
associative psychology of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), on which he built much of 
his own theoretical apparatus. Steinthal always remained cautious about pressing the claims 
of his system, however. In introducing a formalization of the psychological process of 
‘apperception’, Steinthal (1881: 198) commented: “Let us now represent the process of 
apperception in a psychological formula. Even if we do not flatter ourselves that we have 
created a mathematical psychology in this way, such formulae must promote clarity.”14 
Steinthal never ventured to offer a comprehensive, systematic account of his formulae — 
although his pupil Gustav Glogau (1844–1894) did try to meet this challenge (Glogau 
1876) — and only ever used the formulae in a sporadic, ad hoc way in his writings. 
The core issue in Steinthal’s critique is therefore Schleicher’s reduction of the study of 
language, in both the source of its data and its explanatory horizon, to “the barest outer 
appearances […] the empty shell of language” (die barste Aeußerlichkeit […] die leere Schale 
der Sprache [Steinthal 1860: 434]). Schleicher’s subsequent move to simply conflate outer 
linguistic forms with their inner properties confirmed Steinthal’s greatest fears. In his review 
of Schleicher’s (1865b) Unterscheidung von Nomen und Verbum in der lautlichen Form, 
Steinthal (1865) insists that the outer form of language does not stand for itself; there is 
indeed much that goes on in the minds of speakers which finds no phonetic expression. The 
linguist’s task is to interpret the outer form in order to discover the inner form: 
                                               
13 Original: “daß die Form in jedem Augenblicke das nähere oder entferntere Resultat von Functionen ist, d.h. 
nicht bloß beständigen Kräften, sondern auch von Processen und Lagen, in welche die sich bildenden Theile 
gebracht sind.” 
14  Original: “Versuchen wir den Apperceptions-Process in einer psychologischen Formel darzustellen. 
Schmeicheln wir uns auch nicht, dass damit eine mathematische Psychologie geschaffen werde, so muss doch 
solche Formeln die Klarheit fordern.” 
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When we say [the German expressions], “red today, dead tomorrow”, “learnt in youth, done in 
age”, the opposition and comparison do not lie in the expression, but the mind attributes that 
which is not in the linguistic expression by tracing each word back to the intuition that 
underlies it […] So some things do indeed occur in the mind that are not expressed in the 
sound, but which the sound prompts the mind [to think of], since they are indeed included in 
that which the sound indicates. (Steinthal 1865: 506)15 
While in his reviews Steinthal (1860, 1865) does not employ the term ‘materialism’, he brings 
this label into play in later writings to describe just those aspects of Schleicher’s thought 
criticized in his reviews. In his Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft, for example, Steinthal (1881: 
47) comments that Schleicher, “in connection with modern materialism, made the assertion 
that the mind or the thought or the content of language is the function of the sound”.16 This is 
the same argument that Lefmann had made some ten years earlier in calling Schleicher a 
materialist:  
Nothing is in language and nothing exists in the feeling of the speaker that is not expressed 
phonetically. Schleicher uttered this sentence and in doing so stated the alpha and omega, so to 
speak, of his ‘monistic’ or rather materialist underlying philosophy. (Lefmann 1870: 73)17 
The accusation of ‘materialism’ was then not born of an in principle objection to analogies 
between linguistics and the natural sciences, but was rather originally directed at the specific 
natural scientific approach Schleicher sought to emulate in his linguistic morphology. 
Schleicher’s morphology and the biological approaches that inspired it reduced their objects 
of study to their perceptible outer forms and the scope of their explanations to descriptive 
statements about appearance and change in appearance. 
 
4.  Materialism in context 
As Lefmann acknowledges in the quotation above, Schleicher actually refused the label 
‘materialism’ and preferred to describe his philosophy as a kind of ‘monism’. Materialism 
implies that matter is privileged over other kinds of substance, argues Schleicher (1863: 8), 
while in monism “there is neither mind nor matter in the usual sense, but rather just one thing 
that is both at the same time.”18 He adds: “To accuse this view that rests on observation of 
materialism is just as preposterous as to accuse it of spiritualism” (ibid., p.9, n.1).19 These 
protestations are not simply terminological quibbling on Schleicher’s part, but rather represent 
manoeuvring around ideologically occupied terrain. In the second half of the 19th century, 
                                               
15 Original: “Wenn wir sagen: ‚heute roth, morgen todt’, ‚jung gewohnt, alt gethan’, so liegt im Ausdruck nicht 
Gegensatz und nicht Vergleichung; aber was nicht im sprachlichen Ausdruck liegt, denkt dennoch der Geist 
hinzu, indem er jede Worte auf die zu Grunde liegende Anschauung zurückführt […] Es geht also thatsächlich 
manches im Geiste vor, was nicht im Laute ausgedrückt ist, wozu ihn dennoch der Laut veranlaßt, weil es 
thatsächlich in dem eingeschlossen ist, was der Laut bezeichnet.”  
16 Original: “[…] wollte man nun, in Anschluss an den heutigen Materialismus, die Behauptung aufstellen 
[Fußnote: Das hat S c h l e i c h e r getan.], der Geist oder der Gedanke oder der Inhalt der Sprache sei die 
Function des Lautes.” 
17 Original: “Nichts ist in der Sprache und nichts existiert im Gefühle des Sprechenden, was nicht lautlich 
ausgedrückt wird. Schleicher hat diesen Satz ausgesprochen und damit, so zu sagen, das Alpha und Omega 
seiner ‚monistischen’ oder geradezu materialistischen Grundanschauung.” 
18 Original: “[ …] es gibt weder Geist noch Materie im gewöhnlichen Sinne, sondern nur eines, das beides 
zugleich ist.” 
19 Original: “Diese auf Beobachtung beruhende Ansicht des Materialismus zu beschuldigen, ist eben so verkehrt, 
als wollte man sie des Spiritualismus zeihen.” 
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materialism became inseparable from radical politics and an anti-religious stance. We may 
ask where Schleicher stood in relation to these ideological debates. 
Three names that feature prominently in Schleicher’s (1863) essay Die Darwinsche 
Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft provide us with the means to triangulate his position in 
the contemporary intellectual landscape. The first two are those of Matthias Schleiden (1804–
1881) and Carl Vogt (1817–1895), whose Wissenschaftliche Botanik (Schleiden 1842) and 
Physiologische Briefe (Vogt 1847) Schleicher (1863: 6) cites as his chief sources of 
instruction about Entwicklungsgeschichte; that is, developmental or evolutionary history. The 
third name is that of Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), to whom the essay is dedicated: it was 
Haeckel who recommended Schleicher read Darwin’s Origin of Species in its first German 
translation (Darwin 1860 [1859]) and thereby prompted him to write the essay (see Schleicher 
1863: 3). All three of these names are deeply bound up with scientific materialism, a 
movement in 19th-century Germany centred around a reductionist biology that recognized 
only physical matter and mechanical forces and as a result rejected such traditional entities as 
vital forces, the mind and soul. Scientific materialism was no timid and remote pastime of the 
ivory tower: the most vocal members of the movement weaponized their science and wielded 
it against political conservatism and religion (see Gregory 1977; Beiser 2014: 53-96). 
Within the confines of the laboratory, a mild form of materialism was a logical 
consequence of the great scientific leaps achieved by a commitment to empirical observation. 
Above all in biology, observable matter and mechanical interactions were in many cases now 
enough to explain phenomena for which vital forces had previously been invoked. As an 
unobservable deus ex machina, such forces now seemed incurably speculative and 
superfluous. Exemplified in his Wissenschaftliche Botanik, among other texts, Schleiden’s 
pioneering work on cell theory served as an inspiration to materialism: taking advantage of 
the latest advances in microscopy, he formulated a sober, empirically minded account of the 
organism as a conglomeration of cellular machines. Schleiden (e.g., 1844) was himself not 
averse to defending his empiricism and philosophical agnosticism against attacks from the 
rival romantic tradition of Naturphilosophie, although the later aggressive intrusion of 
scientific materialism into religious and political spheres was too much for him: Schleiden 
(1863) later completely disavowed the movement. 
Vogt and Haeckel, by contrast, were in the vanguard of evangelical materialism in their 
respective periods, and did much to shape its aggressive and political character. Vogt may be 
counted as one of the chief instigators of scientific materialism and his Physiologische Briefe 
as one of the movement’s defining texts. Originally serialized in the Augsburger Allgemeine 
Zeitung from 1845 to 1847, the Physiologische Briefe offered an overview of the latest 
advances in the life sciences to the general public. Over the years in which they appeared, the 
emphasis on material processes, the straying into questions of the mind and soul, and the 
polemical tone with respect to traditional explanations became more marked. Vogt wrote the 
Briefe during a three-year stay in Paris, in which he fraternized with such figures as the 
Russian anarchist Michail Bakunin (1814–1876) and the German revolutionary poet Georg 
Herwegh (1817–1875), among many others.20 His 1848 Ocean und Mittelmeer, an account of 
                                               
20 Another of Vogt’s acquaintances in Paris was Karl Marx (1818–1883), with whom Vogt quickly developed a 
relationship of mutual hatred. From their time in Paris to the end of their respective lives, Marx showed little 
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the research expeditions he undertook with these two companions, draws at many points 
explicit connections between his science and his increasingly radical political views (cf. 
Gregory 1977: 58-69).  
When the Europe-wide revolution of 1848 came to the German-speaking lands, Vogt had 
already returned from across the Rhine, and was now the newly appointed Professor of 
Zoology in Gießen. In the German revolution, bourgeois forces rose up to demand 
constitutional government and national unity in a country that was at this time still made up of 
a patchwork of states, small and large, ruled by assorted kings, dukes, princes and their 
aristocratic cliques. With particularly strong support from the students in Gießen, Vogt was 
elected to the national parliament that came together in Frankfurt am Main in 1848, where he 
advocated an uncompromising radical liberal position. After the failure of the revolution, he 
went into exile in Switzerland, where his political venom steadily increased in potency (see 
Gregory 1977: 69-70). 
Haeckel, like Schleicher, rejected the label materialism for his philosophy and preferred 
the term monism. In fact, Haeckel cited Schleicher — alongside Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe (1749–1832), who famously advanced a biological theory of morphology — as one of 
the main inspirations of his thought, and ultimately traced his philosophical genealogy back to 
the monistic pantheism of Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677; see Richards 2008: 124-128). Despite 
his protestations, Haeckel’s contemporary critics generally saw in him the successor of the 
crusading materialism of the previous generation, and he certainly cultivated the polemical 
spirit that term had come to imply. The high point of his polemic came at the end of the 
century, in his 1899 popularizing — and extremely popular — book Die Welträthsel, a 
manifesto of the monistic world view (cf. Richards 2008: 398-403). The title is a reference to 
Emil du Bois-Reymond’s (1818–1896) speech “Die sieben Welträthsel” (Du Bois-Reymond 
1882 [1880]), in which he sketched seven metaphysical questions that he supposed natural 
science would never be able to answer. In responding to Du Bois-Reymond, Haeckel did not 
confine himself to the philosophical plane, but insisted on the social and political relevance of 
his project: 
Our political order will only improve when it is freed from the shackles of the [Catholic] 
Church and when it raises its citizens’ knowledge of the world and of mankind to a higher 
level through general education in the sciences. (Haeckel 1905 [1899]: 10-11)21 
When Haeckel first wrote these words in 1899, German unification had been a reality for 
nearly thirty years, although not brought about through democratic striving from below but 
imposed from above through Prussian power. By the time Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), 
the chancellor of German unification, was forced out of office in 1890, his Realpolitik had 
successfully established a conservative equilibrium, beating off challenges from all sides. 
Although Bismarck himself had reached an entente with the Catholic Church by 1879, ending 
the hard-fought Kulturkampf, the Church remained for radical liberals like Haeckel the 
                                                                                                                                                  
restraint in denouncing the bourgeois liberalism of Vogt’s materialism – which of course was of a very different 
kind from Marx’ own dialectical materialism – and even tried to publicly destroy Vogt’s personal reputation (see 
Gregory 1977: 198-204). 
21 Original: “Unsere Staatsordnung kann nur dann besser werden, wenn sie sich von den Fesseln der Kirche 
befreit, und wenn sie durch allgemeine naturwissenchaftliche Bildung die Welt- und Menschenkenntnis der 
Staatsbürger auf eine höhere Stufe hebt.” 
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primary representative of religious obscurantism (see Gross 2004). Haeckel’s ultimate 
solution, with which he concludes the Welträthsel, is a proposal for a monistic religion and 
ethics reminiscent of Auguste Comte’s (1798–1857) religion of positivism. In aid of monistic 
enlightenment, Haeckel founded the ‘Monistenbund’ in 1906, which brought together a 
diverse spectrum of scientists and scholars who all subscribed to Haeckel’s program to 
varying degrees (see Richards 2008: 371-372). 
Schleicher was steeped in this thought emanating from figures like Schleiden and Vogt 
and continued by Haeckel, in part through his own interests in the natural sciences, in 
particular botany, and in part through immediate personal contact. From childhood Schleicher 
had been a keen amateur botanist, an interest that was encouraged by his physician father (see 
Lefmann 1870: 66). Schleicher (1860: 3) commented himself that Haeckel most probably had 
his “horticultural and botanical hobbies” (gärtnerischen und botanischen Liebhabereien) in 
mind when he recommended reading Darwin’s Origin of Species, which Schleicher (1864) 
also reviewed from a horticultural perspective for the Zeitschrift für deutsche Landwirthe. 
Both Schleiden and Haeckel were colleagues of Schleicher at the University of Jena, with 
whom he cultivated personal relationships: Schleiden was Professor of Botany from 1839 to 
1863, overlapping with Schleicher in the period 1857–1863, and Haeckel was in Jena from 
1861 until the end of his career, beginning with his Habilitation and eventually rising to 
Professor of Zoology, among other roles. Vogt was never a personal acquaintance of 
Schleicher’s but, as we see in more detail in the following section, Schleicher was a 
correspondent of the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung in the same period in which Vogt’s 
Physiologische Briefe appeared in that newspaper. 
There is of course the possibility that Schleicher’s commitment to these thinkers was 
merely a scientistic veneer on an existing body of methods and philosophy of science internal 
and native to linguistics. On a purely methodological level, a concentration on the perceptible 
outer forms of languages and the postulation of principles that do not go beyond describing 
changes from one historical form to another became firmly established in Indo-European 
comparative grammar in the wake of Franz Bopp’s (1791–1867) pioneering work. Bopp 
himself continued to entertain a broad-ranging conception of language (see Karstens 2012), 
but the nascent field of comparative grammar was nourished by his clinical dissection and 
comparison of outer forms and the investigation of the “physical and mechanical laws” 
(physischen und mechanischen Gesetze [Bopp 1833: iii]) governing them. This 
methodological coincidence between avowedly empirical approaches in the natural sciences 
and historical-comparative linguistics is commented on by Gabelentz in his critique of 
Schleicher’s materialism:  
It is indeed true that that inductive method of the language scholar is exactly the same as that 
of the natural scientist. But we do not name the scientific worker according to the tool that he 
uses, but rather according to the stuff on which he works – and this is truly different enough. 
(Gabelentz 2016 [1891]: 16)22  
                                               
22 Original: “Es ist ja wahr, die inductive Methode des Sprachforschers ist mit der des Naturforschers völlig 
gleich. Aber man nennt den wissenschaftlichen Arbeiter nicht nach dem Werkzeuge, das er führt, sondern nach 
dem Stoffe, den er bearbeitet, – und der ist wahrlich verschieden genug.” 
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Morpurgo Davies’ (1998: 198) rationalization of what she sees as Schleicher’s contorted 
metaphysics similarly supposes that his theory is simply a skin stretched across his existing 
technical skeleton: “It now becomes clear (to the historical linguist at least) that the ‘theory’ 
must be taken in conjunction with the actual results of the concrete historical and comparative 
work which it serves to justify.” The tenets of materialism or monism may have therefore 
merely been the best philosophical fit for Schleicher’s established day-to-day practice.  
Indeed, in his earliest works Schleicher’s philosophical allegiances seem to lie elsewhere. 
As observed in section 2 above, the key elements later criticized as constituting Schleicher’s 
materialist position, immanent laws of development and focus on outer form, were already 
present in his first book, the 1848 Zur vergleichenden Sprachgeschichte. But there Schleicher 
(1848: 20) assimilates the notion of laws of development to the laws of history of the idealist 
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). Koerner (1989: 348) hypothesizes 
that Schleicher’s engagement with Hegel — in particular with Hegel’s Naturphilosophie — 
may have in fact stimulated his natural scientific thinking and helped him on his later course. 
This hypothesis is quite plausible: although the older Naturphilosophie was generally 
denounced by the champions of mechanistic science, they maintained many of its principles 
in modified form. Richards (2008: 118-124), for example, shows how teleological laws of 
development postulated in varieties of Naturphilosophie, in particular Goethe’s morphology, 
were reinterpreted by Haeckel in his general morphology as emergent properties of more 
fundamental mechanical laws. Schleicher’s natural laws of development in language make a 
similar migration from the ideal to the material realm with his shift from Hegel to natural 
scientific models. 
Schleicher’s philosophical views are therefore the product of many different influences. 
However, he was still indisputably embedded in the contemporary movement of scientific 
materialism. Schleiden, Vogt and Haeckel, the three thinkers shaping his Darwinsche Theorie, 
were all key contributors to the development of scientific materialism, whether they embraced 
or – like Schleicher – rejected the label. Furthermore, as the example of Haeckel shows, an 
initial engagement with idealist positions did not preclude – and could even serve as a 
bridge – to materialist ideas. 
 
5.  Politics and religion 
The political baggage attached to the term ‘materialism’ enhanced its impact as a 
denunciation in what should have otherwise been strictly scientific debates, and this no doubt 
encouraged its use in critiques of Schleicher’s theories. But there is also a legitimate question 
as to what extent Schleicher was driven by political motivations. On the surface, Schleicher’s 
linguistics tends towards the technical and seems at most to sublimate any broader concerns. 
His most overtly political work is his Deutsche Sprache (1860: v-vi), which “has not a 
scholarly but rather a national purpose” to contribute to the “clarification of the German 
national consciousness and strengthening of the German national feeling”.23 Such sentiments 
definitely accord with the German liberalism of the time, but are not enough on their own to 
                                               
23 Original: “[…] es [das Buch Die Deutsche Sprache] hat keinen gelehrten, sondern nur einen nationalen Zweck. 
[…] daß sie [die Schrift] zur Klärung des deutschen Volksbewustseins und zur Kräftigung des deutschen 
Nationalgefühles ein wenn auch geringes Scherflein beiträgt […]” 
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place Schleicher in any specific camp. Various biographical details do, however, reveal that 
Schleicher did indeed belong to the same political milieu that gave rise to materialism. 
As with his interest in the natural sciences, Schleicher’s political formation can be traced 
back to his childhood: Schleicher’s father was active in the contemporary bourgeois-liberal 
milieu and was even one of the founding members of the original Burschenschaft in Jena (see 
Dietze 1966: 15-16). The Burschenschaften were student organizations that campaigned for 
German unification against the conservative forces of the German aristocracy. As a student in 
Leipzig, Tübingen and Bonn from 1840 to 1846, Schleicher was himself active in the 
Burschenschaften and the ideologically aligned Turnvereine (gymnastics clubs). In fact, the 
venue in which Schleicher and Haeckel later made their acquaintance was the Turnverein at 
the University of Jena, which Schleicher led (see Richards 2008: 83). 
Following the completion of his doctorate in 1846, Schleicher spent several years 
travelling around western and central Europe. Through his connections with the radical liberal 
milieu in Bonn, Schleicher was given the role of political correspondent for the Kölnische 
Zeitung and the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, for both of which he reported on the 
Austrian parliament that in the wake of the 1848 revolution met in the Moravian city of 
Kroměříž (see Syballa 1995: 13-27, which includes an index of Schleicher’s articles). The 
parliament was ultimately dissolved by the Austrian Kaiser and his ministers, who resolved to 
restore the old absolutist order and fight liberalism through repression. Although Friedrich 
Bodenstedt (1819–1892), an acquaintance of Schleicher’s from his time in Kroměříž, later 
reported that Schleicher took little interest in politics and only worked as political 
correspondent so he could travel to Slavic lands and learn their languages (see Syballa 1995: 
14; Dietze 1966: 22-23), Schleicher’s articles from this time evince a strong sympathy for the 
liberal cause. For the Austrian authorities, too, Schleicher’s articles were sufficiently 
incendiary to warrant interception in the post, even though other correspondents for the 
Kölnische Zeitung and Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung continued to report from Austrian 
territory unhindered. By 1849 the Austrian authorities’ pressure on Schleicher grew to the 
point that he felt compelled to flee from Prague by night in order to escape his anticipated 
arrest (Syballa 1995: 22). 
But in the following year, 1850, Schleicher returned to Prague, where he stayed until 1857. 
One progressive concession of the Austrian authorities to the 1848 revolution was to institute 
a reform of the Austrian education system, for which many professors had to be brought in 
from abroad. On the recommendation of Georg Curtius (1820–1885), Schleicher was called to 
Prague as an Extraordinary Professor, a major leap in his academic career (Syballa 1995: 28-
29); in 1853 he was promoted to Ordinarius. Schleicher did not enjoy his time in Prague: in 
rather immoderate memoires (published in Syballa 1995: 100-112), Schleicher not only 
laments the perceived poor quality of his students and colleagues but also complains of the 
oppressive political atmosphere of post-1848 Austria. In the effective police state that existed 
at this time, he faced constant harassment from the authorities, who held him in suspicion for 
his former work as political correspondent (see Syballa 1995: 48-55). The police placed him 
under observation and at one point even searched his house. A sensationalized — and, 
according to Syballa (1995: 48-49), apocryphal — version of Schleicher’s troubles, first 
recorded in Lefmann’s (1870: 37) biography, even has Schleicher being deported for a time to 
Vienna. 
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In 1857 Schleicher left Prague for an insecure and lowly paid position as 
Honorarprofessor in Jena. The position had been arranged for him by a friend at the 
university, whom Schleicher had begged for help two years earlier. The final trigger that led 
to Schleicher’s decision to abandon Prague was personal tragedy — the death of his newborn 
son in 1855 (Syballa 1995: 54-55) — but this came on top of his ongoing dissatisfaction and 
discomfort there. His political views — and the suffering he experienced because of them — 
were unquestionably a factor in his flight from Prague and his later unwillingness to move 
away from Jena, despite his poor position at the university there. At the end of Prague 
memoires, Schleicher (in Syballa 1995: 112) clearly marks himself as a nationally minded, 
anti-Catholic German liberal: “I have learnt some things in Austria, good and bad, but the best 
thing that I learnt there is the deep appreciation of my German homeland and of my luck in 
being the child of Protestant parents.”24 
In subsequent years, Schleicher refused calls to professorships in Warsaw, St. Petersburg 
and Dorpat (present-day Tartu, Estonia), all of which were at that time part of the Russian 
Empire. In refusing the call to Dorpat in 1863, Schleicher wrote the following justification to 
his friend Reinhold Köhler (1830–1892):  
That for a’ that an’ a’ that I gave up Warsaw back then was definitely one of the few clever 
tricks that I have ever pulled. I’ll let that be a lesson to me and I never want to turn my back 
on Germany. The way things are now, anyone can consider themselves lucky if they are not a 
civil servant in either Prussia or Austria but rather enjoy the noble freedom of the derided 
pirate states. (Schleicher to Köhler, 4 March 1863, quoted from Dietze 1966: 47; complete 
letter in Dietze 1960: 278)25 
By his own account, Schleicher preferred the “noble freedom” of the “derided pirate states” – 
that is, the small and comparatively liberal independent states of Central Germany, such as the 
Duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, in which Jena was located — to the hulking, backward 
empires of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.26 Particularly revealing is his choice of words in 
opening the letter — “for a’ that an’ a’ that” (trotz alledem und alledem) — a catchphrase 
derived from the poem “Trotz alledem” by Ferdinand Freiligrath (1810–1876). Originally a 
translation of Robert Burns’ (1759–1796) “Is there for an honest poverty” (also known under 
the title “A man’s a man for a’ that”), Freiligrath later rewrote his poem as a commentary on 
the events of 1848. Since that time, it has been constantly redeployed and reworked in support 
of diverse progressive political causes (see Robb & John 2011).  
Although Schleicher himself was no protagonist in the political and religious crusades of 
the materialists, he was immersed in the same radical liberal milieu from which their ideology 
emerged. The persecution he faced for these connections in post-1848 Austria led him to 
                                               
24 Original: “Ich habe manches in Österreich gelernt, Gutes und Schlimmes, das Beste aber, was ich dort gelernt 
habe, ist die innige Wertschätzung meiner deutschen Heimat und des Glückes, evangelischer Eltern Kind zu 
sein.”  
25 Original: “Daß ich trotz alledem und alledem Warschau damals aufgab, war allerdings einer der wenigen 
gescheiten Streiche die ich je ausgeführt. Ich lasse mir das eine Lehre sein und will niemals Deutschland den 
Rücken kehren. Wie die Dinge jetzt stehen, so kann sich jeder nur Glück wünschen, der weder in Preußen noch 
in Österreich Beamter ist, sondern der edeln Freiheit der verspöttelten Raubstaaten genießt.” Note that professors 
in the German-speaking countries then as now are considered civil servants. 
26 One of Schleicher’s later letters to Köhler (published in Dietze 1960: 279-280) indicates that Schleicher may 
have been prepared to compromise on his anti-Prussian sentiment. After the death of Franz Bopp in 1867, 
Schleicher lamented that he would not be called to Bopp’s former chair in Berlin. 
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prefer a life of some financial hardship on the institutional margins of the University of Jena 
to a prestigious professorship in a reactionary state like Austria, Prussia, or Russia.  
 
6.  Concluding observations 
What we today generally refer to as Schleicher’s ‘Darwinian’ linguistics was for his 
German contemporaries not so much a manifestation of Darwinism as of ‘materialism’. 
Schleicher rejected the label materialism, however, and preferred to describe his views as a 
variety of ‘monism’. But the intellectual genealogy that Schleicher traced for himself places 
him squarely in the tradition of the contemporary German movement of scientific materialism. 
What must be taken into account is that the choice of label was no simple matter of abstract 
philosophical convictions: ‘materialism’ was in this period inextricably associated with 
radical liberal politics and its accompanying anti-religious sentiment. The accusation of 
materialism in a scientific debate therefore came armed with political barbs. Even though 
Schleicher was comparatively muted in employing his science in the service of politics, he did 
indeed belong to the same radical milieu from which the representatives of political 
materialism came. His invocation of materialist doctrines therefore resulted not only from his 
philosophy of science, but was also a product of his political views and social background. 
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SUMMARY 
Towards the end of his career, August Schleicher (1821–1868), the great consolidator of 
Indo-European historical-comparative linguistics in the mid-19th century, famously drew 
explicit parallels between linguistics and the new evolutionary theory of Darwinism. Based on 
this, it has become customary in linguistic historiography to refer to Schleicher’s ‘Darwinian’ 
theory of language, even though it has long been established that Schleicher’s views have 
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other origins that pre-date his contact with Darwinism. For his contemporary critics in 
Germany, however, Schleicher’s thinking was an example not of Darwinism but of 
‘materialism’. This article examines what ‘materialism’ meant in 19th-century Germany — its 
philosophical as well as its political dimensions — and looks at why Schleicher’s critics 
applied this label to him. It analyses the relevant aspects of Schleicher’s linguistics and 
philosophy of science and the criticisms directed against them by H. Steinthal (1823–1899). It 
then discusses the contemporary movement of scientific materialism and shows how 
Schleicher’s political views, social background and personal experiences bound him to this 
movement. 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Dans son œuvre tardive, August Schleicher (1821–1868), qui est considéré un 
personnage-clé des études indo-européennes au milieu du XIXe siècle, entreprit une célèbre 
tentative de tirer des parallèles entre la linguistique et la théorie de l’évolution de Darwin qui, 
à l’époque, était encore neuve. Par la suite, il est devenu courant en historiographie 
linguistique de qualifier de darwiniste la théorie de Schleicher, alors même qu’on savait 
depuis longtemps que les idées de Schleicher trouvent leurs origines ailleurs et qu’elles 
naissent bien avant qu’il se familiarise avec le darwinisme. Aux yeux de ses détracteurs 
contemporains en Allemagne, Schleicher n’était pas un héraut du darwinisme, mais du 
‘matérialisme’. La présente contribution se penche sur ce qu’on entendait par ‘matérialisme’ 
en Allemagne au XIXe siècle — du point de vue philosophique ainsi que politique — et 
identifie la raison pour laquelle les critiques de Schleicher le taxaient de matérialiste. Seront 
analysées les théories de Schleicher dans les domaines de la linguistique et de la philosophie 
des sciences, ainsi que la critique qu’elles essuyaient de la part de H. Steinthal (1823–1899). 
Ensuite, cet article va enquêter sur le courant contemporain du matérialisme scientifique et 
explorera le lien entre cette mouvance et les idées politiques et philosophiques ainsi que les 
origines sociales de Schleicher. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In seinem Spätwerk versuchte August Schleicher (1821–1868), der als führende Figur der 
Indogermanistik Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts gilt, Parallelen zwischen der Sprachwissenschaft 
und der damals noch neuen Evolutionstheorie Darwins zu ziehen. Infolgedessen ist es in der 
Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft üblich geworden, Schleicher als Darwinisten zu 
bezeichnen, obwohl es schon lange bekannt war, dass die Ansichten Schleichers anderen 
Ursprungs und schon vor seiner Bekanntschaft mit dem Darwinismus entstanden sind. Für 
seine kritischen Zeitgenossen in Deutschland war Schleicher kein Vertreter des Darwinismus, 
sondern des ‘Materialismus’. Dieser Beitrag ergründet den Begriff ‘Materialismus’ im 
Kontext der philosophischen und politischen Auseinandersetzungen im Deutschland des 19. 
Jahrhunderts und ermittelt den Grund für den Materialismusvorwurf gegen Schleicher. Er 
untersucht die linguistischen und wissenschaftsphilosophischen Theorien Schleichers und die 
dagegen gerichtete Kritik von H. Steinthal (1823–1899). Anschließend untersucht der Beitrag 
die zeitgenössische Bewegung des wissenschaftlichen Materialismus und erforscht den 
Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Bewegung und den politischen und philosophischen 
Ansichten sowie der sozialen Herkunft Schleichers. 
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